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“Dirty Peace?” 
The Political Economy of Peacebuilding
ConfErEnCE DoCumEnTaTion
Elvan isikozlu, Susanne Heinke (Eds.) \ BiCC
"Dirty Peace?" the Political economy of PeacebuilDing\ Elvan IsIkozlu, susannE HEInkE (Eds.)
Summary
On 19 October 2017, BICC hosted its annual International Academic 
Conference on the topic of “‘Dirty Peace?’ The Political Economy of 
Peacebuilding” in Bonn. The conference brought together over 100 
academics and practitioners from around the world to exchange concepts, 
empirical observations and lessons learned on the prerequisites, patterns 
and consequences of peace negotiations. 
In her welcome address, Beate Wieland, Head of Department for Research 
at the Ministry of Culture and Science of the German State of North Rhine-
Westphalia, underlined the importance of ensuring a lasting peace to 
prevent violent conflict in the future. She opined that a lasting peace 
comes from improving peoples’ living conditions in conflict regions.  
The first panel examined some of the conditions for successful mediation 
in peacebuilding negotiations, while the second panel focussed on the 
consequences inclusivity or exclusivity have on the success of these 
negotiations. The third panel discussed lessons learned from practical 
experience and engagement in negotiations and peacebuilding processes 
in Afghanistan and South Sudan. A concluding roundtable highlighted 
several takeaways from the conference, including the added value of a 
political economy perspective, the critical need for capacity and local 
leadership of peacebuilding initiatives and the need to unpack the various 
agendas and interests that, left unexamined, make the peace process seem 
‘dirty’ as opposed to what it really is: complex. 
The conference was generously funded by the Foundation for International 
Dialogue of the Savings Bank in Bonn and the US Consulate General in 
Düsseldorf. 
“Dirty” remnants of war: An artillery shell lying  
in a bombed house in the historical centre of Mossul, Iraq
Photo cover: Carina Schlüsing \ BICC
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Conference participants \ listening to the welcome address  
of Beate Wieland (above) in the Universitätsclub Bonn
Beate Wieland \ Head of Department for Research  
at the Ministry of Culture and Science of the German 
State of North Rhine-Westphalia, in her welcome 
address highlighted:
“A way out of such seemingly hopeless 
confrontations can actually be put into very  
simple words: It’s a matter of ending a conflict  
or of preventing a fresh eruption. And first of all,  
it’s a matter of stabilizing and improving people’s 
living conditions in conflict regions. (…) Today’s 
expert conference will especially focus on incentives 
and impulses for successful peace negotiations.
How much we in North Rhine-Westphalia are 
affected by international conflicts has been outlined 
vividly by the Minister President of our Federal State, 
Armin Laschet, in his recent government statement. 
At the edges of the European Union in Ukraine, 
and beyond the Mediterranean in Syria and Libya, 
war still holds sway. Migration flows are increasing 
all over the world—and Europe and in particular 
Germany has become the main destination of a great 
number of refugees fleeing from war, but also from 
the misery in many African states. Their way may 
lead them from Aleppo to Athens, from Raqua to 
Recklinghausen, from Libya to Lipperland. What’s 
happening in conflict regions all over the world 
by now affects every community in North Rhine-
Westphalia.
Times of unrest like these are a call to politics when 
it comes to offering orientation and taking action 
decisively. Times of unrest like these are a call to 
science when it comes to investigating reasonable 
conditions for lasting peace and discussing practical 
impulses. Peace and conflict research is a particularly 
modern human science. Today more than ever, we are 
possibly dependent on its results.
Therefore, we take pride in BICC and in its research 
that provides qualified and sound answers to the 
central questions of a modern world”.
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“Peacebuilding as a market place”
Alex de Waal is Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation and  
Research Professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University 
and is considered one of the foremost experts on Sudan and the Horn of Africa.  
His keynote focussed on the ‘political marketplace’ as an alternative framework  
for understanding state fragility and failure.
alex de Waal \ opened the conference with his keynote
"Dirty Peace?" the Political economy of PeacebuilDing\ Elvan IsIkozlu, susannE HEInkE (Eds.)
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Building on a political economy perspective, Alex de 
Waal defined peacebuilding as a political market-
place where several actors are engaged. Conflicts that 
appear to be about identities often revolve around 
money, resulting in war economies where the lines 
between licit and illicit trade are blurred. As a nego-
tiator during the Darfur peace talks, de Waal often 
observed that loyalty was traded as a commodity, the 
price dictated by supply and demand forces and the 
capability of actors involved. Accordingly, politics 
became a business model dictated by skill and error, 
with transactional and competitive politics dominat-
ing institutional politics. 
In his ‘market analysis’, de Waal noted that partici-
pants of peace negotiations carry out symbolic action 
to drive up the price of their loyalty. The price of an 
actor depends on his impact on the overall nego-
tiations. More actors drive the price up, while the 
market takes the shape of a rivalrous monopoly or 
an oligarchy, with actors exercising sufficient control 
to fix supply prices. In a fragile context however, 
the market is inherently unstable and tends to 
move towards a perfect competition model, as more 
political actors enter. Bearing this in mind, de Waal 
criticized prevailing notions of state-building. While 
theoretically, state-building should be viewed as a 
long-term process spanning several generations, in 
practice it is often reduced to pragmatic short-term 
solutions which ignore the role of business and thus 
become entangled in transactional politics, failing to 
achieve stability. De Waal pointed out that conflict 
should be regarded as a state of constant instability 
that keeps afloat from week to week. The actors com-
peting within a conflict setting usually understand 
each other very well and may even have personal 
relations. Conflict structures require them to fight 
from time to time, even if there is no deep personal 
enmity. Accordingly, the task of a peacemaker is to 
change the structural situation. 
Building on this analysis, de Waal presented two 
cases of complex political marketplaces from his 
own negotiating experience: Sudan and Somalia. In 
Sudan, high oil revenues stabilized the political situ-
ation and allowed for the conclusion of peace agree-
ments. When oil revenues plunged, flows of political 
finance and external actors entered the market, 
leading to a fragmentation of the actors involved 
and a destabilized country. Centralized oil revenues 
had put leaders in a place to buy loyalty, while the 
fragmentation of the market with opportunities 
to defect made negotiations difficult. In Somalia, 
remittances, foreign direct investments (fdi) and oil 
revenues were used to build up a patronage network. 
Government revenues were used as a political budget. 
This system collapsed as soon as the influx of money 
and arms decreased only slightly. As the system was 
very inefficient and the actors involved felt entitled 
to that money, they changed sides once they could be 
bought out by other leaders.  
In summary, de Waal argued for a new analytical 
toolkit informed by a political economy perspective 
to analyze bargaining behaviour and to better under-
stand the process of negotiations.
Elke Grawert (r.) \ and Luisa Denter (both BICC) following the keynote
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The political economy of expectations 
The opening panel, moderated by Owen Greene, University of Bradford, addressed 
the impact of the economy on bargaining behaviour and the outcome of  
peace talks. Andreas Kindl, German Federal Foreign Office, Véronique Dudouet, 
Berghof Foundation, and Ambassador Günther Bächler, OSCE, spoke from personal 
experience and own empirical research on the conditions for successful  
mediation in international negotiations. 
ambassador Günther Bächler \ explained how the cost–benefit calculus impacts upon negotiations
"Dirty Peace?" the Political economy of PeacebuilDing\ Elvan IsIkozlu, susannE HEInkE (Eds.)
BICC \ knowlEdgE notEs 1 \ 20188 \
The logics of bargaining behaviour
Andreas Kindl, Director for Strategic Communication 
at the Federal Foreign Office in Berlin, gave profound  
insights into the Yemen peace negotiations in 
Geneva, Biel and Kuwait. His observations showed 
that the pre-existing framing conditions, like United 
Nations Security Council Resolution (unscr) 2216  
of April 2015, the diplomatic architecture and lack  
of collocation were substantial impediments that 
contributed to the failure of the ongoing peace 
process. On rare occasions when these conditions  
were not observed, positive steps could be made. 
Kindl also presented a simplified model that ex–
plained bargaining behaviour during negotiations: 
Houthi rebels as well as the Yemeni government, 
supported by Saudi Arabia, employed a wide range 
of negotiating techniques to delay or preserve the 
talks (differing narratives, good guy/bad guy, public 
disinformation and leaks). In addition, there was a 
lack of communication between the government 
mediators in Riad and Houthi leaders in Sanaa. 
Both conflict sides changed their bargaining tactics 
to attain advantages on the battlefield and to gain 
temporary personal benefits. The question that arises 
in this context is what the international community 
can do about this. Kindl suggested possible courses 
of action: Massively facilitate the victory of one side, 
intervene as peace enforcer, stop supporting warring 
parties or freeze the territorial status quo. In reality, 
however, there is no appetite for this, and none of 
these parties were put under sufficient pressure to 
feel the need to give up core positions during the 
negotiation process. 
financing armed groups  
during ceasefires
Véronique Dudouet, Senior Researcher and Pro-
gramme Director at the Berghof Foundation, pre-
sented the results of her empirical research about  
the incentives that make a difference during  
negotiations towards achieving peace. She focused  
on the funding of non-state armed groups (nsags) 
in-between active fighting and the conclusion of a 
peace agreement. Through information gathered 
from the selected cases of ETA in the Basque Country, 
the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the KNU in Myanmar, GAM in 
Aceh and several armed groups in Mali, she analyzed 
whether ceasefires represent a fundraising con-
straint or an opportunity for non-state belligerents. 
Her research revealed that the impact of ceasefires 
on fundraising options always depends on the nature 
of the armed groups, their resources and the spe-
cific terms of the ceasefire. Overall, armed groups 
that were part of a unilateral or bilateral ceasefire 
owen Greene \ moderated the panel
Véronique Dudouet \ analyzed whether ceasefires represent 
a fundraising constraint
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were able to more than offset the costs the peace 
process imposed on them by increasing their inter-
nal and external options for funding. However, some 
ceasefire collapsed partly due to the government’s 
interpre tation of armed groups’ sustained rent-seek-
ing activities as a sign of bad faith and predatory 
behaviour. Other ceasefires collapsed (or are cur-
rently deteriorating) because group leaders, not their 
combatants, profited from the state policy—which 
led to increasing division and polarization within 
the armed organization. 
Doudouet concluded that the lessons negotiation 
advisors could draw from this are that the politi-
cal and economic nature, interests, incentives and 
power of armed groups must be analyzed correctly. 
Also, NSAGs must have the possibility to continue to 
engage in fundraising opportunities if funds are used 
for peaceful activities. To prevent armed groups from 
developing a vested interest in protracted dialogue, 
visible and measurable progress must be the condi-
tion for direct funding of the peace talks. Therefore, 
mediators must build economic incentives into the 
details of the peace process early to compensate for 
the temporary loss of war-time revenues, allowing 
the leadership to have faith in the availability of 
 economic opportunities as a result of negotiations.
How does the cost–benefit calculus 
impact upon negotiations?
Ambassador Günter Bächler, OSCE, argued that 
economic factors have always had an impact on 
the willingness, interests and positions of conflict 
parties with regard to commencing, conducting or 
finalizing negotiations. Since the internationaliza-
tion of civil wars in globalized markets, economic 
factors have become even more important and deci-
sive when it comes to the probability of a negotiated 
settlement. At the same time, there has always been 
a plethora of factors that determine the power or the 
best alternative to a negotiated agreement between 
the parties. Focusing on the Geneva International 
Discussions of 2008, he examined the impact of the 
political economy on the peace process in Georgia’s 
breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Ambassador Bächler stated that in these negotia-
tions economic cooperation, separated from status 
and security policy issues, functioned as a connector 
between Russia and Georgia that were otherwise  
very hostile about the situation in the southern  
Caucasus. Mediators used economic dialogue about 
trade, customs and transport regulations to resolve 
negotiation problems in the peace process. 
Participants from the plenary asked about the right 
number of players and external powers involved in 
peace negotiations, as well as about the influence 
of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration 
(ddr) and the associated payouts on bargaining 
behaviours. Dudouet replied that per diems can work 
as an incentive but only if they are combined with 
comprehensible signs of progress. She added that 
DDR provisions are limited in their incentivizing 
power because they are only time bound and paid 
to individuals. Kindl pointed out that there are too 
many players in the negotiations over Yemen. He 
recommended a number under ten and the stronger 
involvement of Russia. A critique was made that 
mediators may repeat the 1960s détente policy in 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia—freeze a conflict and 
then assist in creating a modus vivendi—, whereas  
a successful peace agreement would depend on 
achieving state control over the involved non-state 
armed groups.
andreas Kindl \ gave profound insights into the Yemen peace negotiations
"Dirty Peace?" the Political economy of PeacebuilDing\ Elvan IsIkozlu, susannE HEInkE (Eds.)
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The panellists (f. l. t. r.) \ Andrea Warnecke, Jocelyn Mawdsley, Henk-Jan Brinkman and Jörn Grävingholt
How inclusive, how exclusive should  
peacebuilding be?
Moderated by Jocelyn Mawdsley, University of Newcastle, the three panellists 
approached this topic from different perspectives. Henk-Jan Brinkman,  
UN Peacebuilding Support Office, discussed the inclusion of non-armed  
groups in peace processes. Andrea Warnecke, Austrian Study Centre for  
Peace and Conflict Resolution, focused on peacebuilding implementers.  
Jörn Grävingholt of the German Development Institute provided a  
conceptual framework on the question of exclusivity and inclusivity. 
BICC \ knowledge notes 1 \ 2018 11 \
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Which stakeholders and  
external actors should be involved on 
what grounds? 
Henk-Jan Brinkman of the UN Peacebuilding 
Support Office stressed the necessity of involving 
members of civil society and communities in the 
peace process. Peacebuilding needs to be inclusive, 
which means that unarmed groups also have to be 
part of the actual peacebuilding process. If groups 
are excluded from the peace process, peace is bound 
to fail. In his presentation, Brinkman focused on the 
example of women and youth as two groups who 
need to be considered in peace processes. Accord-
ing to him, there is strong evidence that when 
women are meaningfully involved in peace pro-
cesses, peace has a higher quality and lasts longer. 
Whereas in the past, women were excluded from 
peace processes, there is now an increasing number 
of women  mediators. While previously, youth were 
considered to be a risk, they are now recognized as 
agents of change. Brinkman also proposed to study 
and monitor horizontal inequalities, i.e. inequalities 
among groups. The focus should be on the people 
themselves, on their needs and perceptions. 
The role of norms in securing access, 
legitimacy and cooperation  
in intra-state peacebuilding
Andrea Warnecke of the Austrian Study Center for 
Peace and Conflict Resolution asked why peace-
building has emerged as a depoliticized practice 
even though peacebuilding is an inherently political 
project. In virtue of their institutional mandates as 
international organizations, many peacebuilders 
follow the two guiding principles of neutrality and 
impartiality. At the same time, they have to address 
political contestation and engage with factions in 
most peace processes. In her talk, Warnecke demon-
strated how development and humanitarian agen-
cies who are engaged in peacebuilding efforts seek 
to resolve this dilemma. For example, humanitar-
ian and development agencies reconceptualize the 
principles of neutrality and impartiality by defining 
them in accordance with seemingly universal and 
objective standards rather than the perception of 
the parties. However, such highly de-contextualized 
principles do not take into account the local settings 
of the conflict.   
The demand and supply side of donors: 
The games of ‘giving’ and their impact 
on incentives
Jörn Grävingholt from the German Development 
Institute provided some conceptual ideas on the 
question of how donor incentives can contribute 
to inclusiveness. He pointed to the fact that even 
though the normative goal of inclusive peace has 
replaced the notion of liberal peace, the persistence 
of exclusivity in peace processes is still the reality. 
A consideration of inclusivity has to discuss the 
explicit goal of exclusivity as well—as exemplified 
by the discussion on the in- or exclusion of so-called 
Islamic State (is) and the Taliban in peace processes.  
The topic of justice may not be ignored either. 
 Grävingholt presented an overview table denoting 
the typical effect on inclusiveness of different types 
of external peacebuilding activities sponsored by  
international donors. With a political economy 
framework in mind, he concluded that by default 
most donor activities in post-conflict societies have 
a tendency to lean towards promoting exclusivity 
rather than inclusivity in peacebuilding. However, 
according to Grävingholt, this was not a necessity, 
as intentional choices on the part of donors could 
change much of this logic. Consequently, being  
aware of the political economy of donorship in 
peacebuilding was no less crucial for successful 
support than technical expertise.  
The plenary discussion centred on the question  
of inclusivity of certain groups in peace processes, 
e.g. organized criminal groups or even regimes that 
oppose the peacebuilding process. The challenge  
is to establish special grievance and dialogue  
mechanisms.
"Dirty Peace?" the Political economy of PeacebuilDing\ Elvan IsIkozlu, susannE HEInkE (Eds.)
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The panellists (f. l. t. r.) \ Ambassador Kai Eide, Sami Faltas and Wolf-Christian Paes
Why do conflicts ‘transform’:  
is there a (marginal) gain in protracted conflicts?
In the panel moderated by Sami Faltas, University of Groningen (retired),   
Ambassador Kai Eide, Foreign Office (retired), Norway, and Wolf-Christian Paes, 
BICC, discussed lessons learned from peace processes in Colombia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Afghanistan and South Sudan.
BICC \ knowledge notes 1 \ 2018 13 \
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Who owns the peace?  
Lessons learned from failed and 
successful peace processes
In analyzing the ‘architecture’ of peace processes, Kai 
Eide showed some aspects of different successful and 
failed peace arrangements that might point to some 
dos and don’ts for future peace negotiations. 
One successful example of negotiations is the 
Colombian peace agreement of November 2016. Both 
parties, the Colombian government and the FARC, 
had been highly committed. Long preparatory and 
exploratory phases, during which both parties agreed 
on an agenda of a limited number of items, as well as 
the initial secrecy of the peace process, were decisive 
factors. Rather than acting as mediators, all inter-
national actors were facilitators, logistical assistants 
(e.g. ICRC) or humanitarian helpers (e.g. UN organ-
izations) who guaranteed local ownership of the 
agenda-setting process.
As concerns the peace process in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, Ambassador Eide was critical of the 
leading role of the United States. Little impact of 
local ownership and insufficient commitment by 
co-owners, such as the European Union, NATO and 
OSCE, resulted in the failure of the implementation 
process. 
On Afghanistan, Kai Eide discussed the contentious 
issue of negotiations with the Taliban. In his view, 
the establishment of a Taliban office in Doha was 
a positive step towards the realization of a peace 
process. But the fact that Afghanistan considers 
 Pakistan to be a conflict party and the Taliban con-
sider the United States a party to the conflict makes 
the process even more complicated. For Ambassador 
Eide, who favours a stronger role of the United States, 
a strategy based on a balance of security and dialogue 
is necessary. Furthermore, he pointed out the need 
for impartial international facilitators, strong owner-
ship of the peace process by the Afghan government 
and the Taliban and confidentiality to prevent the 
process from being leaked to and interrupted by the 
public.  
According to Ambassador Eide, the main reason for 
the complicated situation in Iraq and Syria is the 
significant number of highly diverse parties involved 
and their refusal to negotiate with each other. He 
pointed out that the possibility to learn from the 
success of the Colombian peace process is,unfortu-
nately, limited because the Columbian conflict only 
included a few parties—in contrast to Afghanistan, 
Iraq or Syria.
a discussant from the plenary \ talks about his experiences in peace-
building
Guns, goons and gerrymandering— 
How military commanders benefit 
from conflict and peace
Wolf-Christian Paes pointed out three central 
problems of the peace process in South Sudan: First, 
Western actors tend to talk only to people with 
similar views and values as themselves, and thus 
the commitment of these actors does not necessar-
ily affect the real power structures. Second, most of 
the people negotiating in South Sudan have little 
understanding of and experience with negotiations. 
"Dirty Peace?" the Political economy of PeacebuilDing\ Elvan IsIkozlu, susannE HEInkE (Eds.)
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 Stimulating processes like demobilization, demili-
tarization and reintegration (ddr) or security sector 
reform (ssr) is difficult—primarily because of the 
massive gap between theory and implementation.  
Third, all actors involved in the South Sudan peace 
process—including international actors and insti-
tutes such as GIZ or BICC—are part of the peace 
economy and benefit in some way from it. This 
explains why some actors continue their activities 
even when changes in the political environment 
make it impossible for these activities to achieve 
their intended outcomes. 
In addition, Wolf-Christian Paes observed a tendency 
towards remilitarization in the fight against terror-
ism, for example. This tendency leads to a military 
approach in parallel to negotiations, causing the 
 dangerous approach of achieving peace as a result 
 of military success rather than an investment in 
develop ment or negotiations. He concluded by 
 pointing out two contentious issues that BICC and 
other organizations are facing in South Sudan: Shall 
we give war a chance if peace negotiations and 
external intervention fail? In his view, this is highly 
problematic. The other issue is that while inclusive 
peace is desirable, it is simply not realistic for SSR 
processes, since not every party will benefit and 
thus accept the outcome. Therefore, to build peace, 
Wolf-Christian Paes \ reflected upon the problems of the peace process in 
South Sudan
the high political and economic costs of SSR must 
be faced—even against the positions of warlords or 
other actors. 
To open the debate, Sami Faltas pointed out that 
long-running wars seem to have become a system 
that perpetuates itself. Looking at this from a rational 
choice perspective, as warring parties will weigh 
the costs and benefits of a war and a potential peace 
process, they need to be provided with incentives for 
supporting the peace process and disincentives for 
continuing war. In this framework, he stressed that 
ownership must be local and inclusive while exter-
nal actors can assist in fostering peace as long as 
they do not take over the lead role in the process.
With the plenary open for questions, one question 
that was raised was whether German and European 
positions in peace processes should differ more 
from UN positions, which are more maximalist and 
therefore not often feasible or even helpful. Ambas-
sador Eide observed that the European Union first 
needs to define a common position on peacebuilding, 
which Germany together with the Nordic countries 
can take the lead on. One participant questioned 
whether high hurdles for conflict parties to become 
part of the peace negotiations were indeed counter-
productive to achieving sustainable peace. Ambas-
sador Eide agreed and stated that more needs to be 
done on this topic, pointing out that, within this 
context, the trade-off between stability and progress 
has to be addressed. This opinion was seconded by 
Wolf-Christian Paes who suggested a reality check of 
assumptions in every conflict before models like DDR 
are implemented.  He advocated choosing progress 
rather than stability to obtain sustainable peace, but 
stressed that actors also have to check their model 
for  feasibility. 
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Which fundamental issues must be addressed  
by peace agreements (power sharing, 
participation, equity, rights)? Lessons learned
In a concluding roundtable, Alex de Waal, Tufts University, Ambassador  
Günther Bächler, OSCE, Ambassador Kai Eide, Foreign Office (retired), Norway,  
and Elke Grawert, BICC, reflected on the main takeaways of the day in a session 
moderated by Andreas Heinemann-Grüder, BICC.
The concluding roundtable \ Alex de Waal, Andreas Heinemann-Grüder, Ambassador Günther Bächler, Elke Grawert and Ambassador Kai Eide (f. l. t. r.)
"Dirty Peace?" the Political economy of PeacebuilDing\ Elvan IsIkozlu, susannE HEInkE (Eds.)
BICC \ knowlEdgE notEs 1 \ 201816 \
De Waal opened his remarks with a reminder: Just 
as conflicts are diverse, approaches to resolving them 
must be as well. A first diagnostic task, he noted, is to 
identify the structural parameters of the conflict—
the power, order and resources of the partiers in con-
flict. A second diagnostic task is to determine at what 
level the conflict is driven. Rather than identifying 
where or at which level the ‘root cause’ of the conflict 
is, it may be more productive to identify the locus at 
which to best stabilize the conflict. The third diag-
nostic task is to clarify the flows of political finance 
and security support in order to understand what 
other interests need to be tackled, while a fourth 
diagnostic task is to identify barriers of entry to the 
political scene. The purpose of this fourth diagnostic 
is to on the one hand, increase the barriers for mili-
tary entrepreneurs while decreasing the barriers for 
nonviolent groups. Finally, the last diagnostic task is 
to identify the meaning of the violence that is used 
in a conflict: For example, violence as looting, vio-
lence as signalling, violence as bargaining, violence 
as conquest or elimination or violence as enforce-
ment. 
‘Less is often more’
Ambassador Eide underlined that, when it comes 
to the inflow of donor funding, ‘less is often more’. 
During his tenure, Afghanistan was the second 
largest recipient of aid from Norway; however, there 
was no structure or capacity in Afghanistan to 
absorb the massive influx of aid. Norway contrib-
uted funding for health and education programmes, 
but there were no institutions in the country that 
could use it for these purposes effectively. Insti-
tution-building, on the other hand, is a very low 
priority on many donor agendas, which creates a 
mismatch between what donors want to give and 
what the countries actually need to begin the peace-
building process. While establishing security must 
be a priority, this should be followed by local institu-
tion- and capacity-building to be able to handle the 
process of rebuilding. 
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it is critical to have a good under-
standing of the local situation
Ambassador Bächler confirmed that the inter-
national community is often too quick to pour 
in money to rebuild after conflict because of the 
magnitude of development and humanitarian needs 
that exist. In so doing, they often do not properly 
study the situation on the ground. He pointed to a 
general naivety among the international community 
about the need for inclusivity in peace negotiations, 
because some political actors are trustworthy while 
others are simply corrupt. He admitted that, as an 
external, it is extremely hard to determine who is 
who. This is why it is critical to have a good under-
standing of the local situation and good relationships 
with local actors.  
Preventing violent conflict is crucial
Elke Grawert reflected on her experiences with  
mediation by elders in conflicts in Darfur who 
have the control over the arms of the community 
members and thus the capacity for building peace 
at the local level. Grawert also commented on how 
donor funding influences peace processes—setting 
incentives but also creating a dilemma: Ever new 
agendas—either for building capacity and encourag-
ing non-state armed groups to participate in peace 
negotiations, or for the professionalization of medi-
ators, or for inclusiveness—accompanied by money 
flows also create competition among implementing 
agencies that are drawing in some and excluding 
other groups. In this sense, peace processes function 
like a marketplace. She underlined that preventing 
violent conflict is crucial. Conflict prevention has to 
tackle a complex entanglement of interests, which 
include, among others, business interests, interests 
in exploiting mineral resources, interests in arms 
exports and in the strategic stabilization of auto-
cratic regimes. 
‘Dirty’ or ‘pure’—Peace is complex
In the plenary discussion, a critical point was raised 
concerning the lack of time in peace processes to 
implement activities. Time is a luxury that imple-
menting agencies do not have, and money is often 
wasted because large budgets must be spent quickly 
and deliver results immediately. Finally, an obser-
vation was made that the question is not whether 
peace is ‘dirty’ or ‘pure’; peace is complex. The 
challenge remains to unpack this complexity and 
to take a more granulated approach to engaging in 
peacebuilding activities and to be clear on the ethical 
framework in which one operates. 
The audience \ shared the observation: Peace is not ‘dirty’ or ‘pure’; peace 
is complex
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